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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
corruption in the Brazilian states. A theorist approach and empirical evidence 
are used. Although many authors emphasize the importance of 
entrepreneurship for the long-run economic growth, few works consider the 
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effect of corruption as a reducer of economic growth once it diminishes 
incentives to entrepreneurship. In order to achieve that, we use an 
instrumental variable as a way to overcome the endogeneity problem 
presented by the nature of our variables of interest. Based on the political 
economy literature, the chosen instrument was the margin of victory for 
regional elections, as a proxy for political competition. However, the results 
show no relation between corruption and entrepreneurship whatsoever. 
Other dependent variables are also tested and the evidence seems to show 
that corruption influences the number of workers in the public sector. 
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Resumo 
Este artigo tem por objetivo avaliar a relação existente entre empreendedo-
rismo e corrupção nos estados do Brasil. Embora muitos autores enfatizem 
a importância do empreendedorismo para o crescimento econômico de lon-
go prazo, são poucos os estudos que relacionam os efeitos negativos da 
corrupção sobre o crescimento econômico, uma vez que ela reduz os incen-
tivos ao empreendedorismo. Para o cumprimento da proposta desta pesqui-
sa, utiliza-se o método de variáveis instrumentais, para lidar com os clássi-
cos problemas de endogeneidade. A variável instrumental adotada é a mar-
gem de vitória nas eleições estaduais, uma proxy para a competição política 
nos estados. Os resultados obtidos não encontram relação entre corrupção 
e empreendedorismo no nível dos estados. Outras variáveis dependentes 
foram testadas também, e a única evidência obtida é que a corrupção 
influencia o número de trabalhadores empregados no setor público. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is a theme that has been gaining wide repercussion 
among both academics and policy makers, as a result of its importance to 
the context of economic growth. Part of this can be explained by a number of 
works that relate entrepreneurial activity to job creation, innovation and 
social well-being (ACS; AMORÓS, 2008; ACS; STOREY, 2004; 
AUDRETSCH; FELDMAN, 1996; BAUMOL, 1990; HART; OULTON, 2001; 
LIBECAP, 1999). Classical economists had already understood the 
importance of entrepreneurship to economic growth, but it was not until 
Schumpeter’s The theory of economic development, of 1912 
(SCHUMPETER, 1982), that it started being considered essential, due to the 
understanding of business cycles and the importance of innovative 
entrepreneurs. 
Since Schumpeter’s work, the analysis and discussion of the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur has become quite frequent, not only in the 
economic literature, but also in different fields of study. In more recent years, 
Schumpeter’s definition of innovation has helped inspire endogenous growth 
models based on research and development (R&D) (JONES, 1995; 
MANKIW; ROMER; WEIL, 1992) and on the uncertain innovation process 
(GROSSMAN; HELPMAN, 1991). Authors such as Gartner and Carter 
(2003) and Audretsch (2007) argue that the variable entrepreneurship 
should be included in growth models under the name of Entrepreneurship 
Capital. Their main argument is that the role of an entrepreneur is different 
both from that of the variables of physical capital (technology) and that of 
human capital (knowledge), which are usual in recent economic growth 
models. In general, the physical capital stock is used as a representation of 
investment and savings levels, while the human capital is used to measure 
the effort applied in work qualification. On the other hand, the 
entrepreneurship capital determines the effort a society makes to spread 
knowledge, not to create it. Hence, they are not to be interchanged or taken 
for each other.  
That being said, the establishment of new companies is strongly related 
to economic growth, as it allows and enables innovation to be spread.1 
An extensive part of the literature explores the regional determinants to 
the establishment of new companies, especially in developed countries such 
as Germany (AUDRETSCH; FRITSCH, 1994; FRITSCH, 1992; HARHOFF, 
1999), Italy (CARREE; SANTARELLI; VERHEUL, 2008; GAROFOLI, 1994), 
                                                          
1
 Without the establishment of new companies, all the knowledge created in R&D could be 
forgotten under the form of papers. 
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England (FOTOPOULOS; SPENCE, 2001), the USA (ACS; ARMINGTON, 
2006) and Spain (ARAUZO-CAROD et al., 2007). These authors study the 
creation of new companies by exploring regional characteristics of the 
economic, social and political environment and the regional productive 
structure. The explanatory variables, usually considered important to 
understanding this phenomenon, are related to demand, urbanization, 
unemployment and firm size. 
On the other hand, there is also an important  part of the literature that 
emphasizes the role of corruption — typically defined as the abuse of public 
power in order to obtain private gains (ROSE-ACKERMAN, 2004) — as an 
inhibitor of economic growth, whether by reducing external investments 
(LAMBSDORFF, 2003; MAURO, 1995) or input productivity (LAMBSDORFF, 
2003; RIVERA-BATIZ, 2002), or by reducing income itself (KAUFMANN; 
KRAAY, 2003). However, the relationship between corruption and 
entrepreneurial activity — here understood as the net establishment of 
companies (number of companies created minus number of companies 
closed) —, has not received the same attention. In this particular case, the 
literature is still scarce and mainly based on a cross-section analysis of 
countries (ANOKHIN; SCHULZE, 2009; DREHER; GASSEBNER, 2013; EL 
HARBI; ANDERSON, 2010). 
There are few studies of the Brazilian case, and the results so far have 
been inconclusive. Palifka (2006) and Melo, Sampaio and Oliveira (2015) 
found evidence of a positive association between corruption and firm 
creation. Bologna and Ross (2015), on the other hand, found a persistent 
negative relation between corruption and entrepreneurship, both in the short 
and in the long run. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by studying the impact of 
regional corruption on the establishment of new companies in Brazil.  We 
believe this analysis is relevant for a number of reasons. First, Brazil is an 
emerging country that, along with Russia, India, China and South Africa, is 
part of the BRICS, a group of countries with growing economic and political 
participation in the world economy. Second, in order to identify the statistical 
causal relationship between corruption and the establishment of new 
companies, the paper tries to solve the econometric problem of endogeneity. 
The possibility that non-observable factors could be simultaneously affecting 
both corruption and establishment of new companies would generate biased 
estimates if we used the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. To 
overcome this problem, we used an instrumental variable (IV) for a two-           
-stage least squares estimation. The chosen IV is widely used in the political 
economy literature to conduct quasi-experiments (regression discontinuity 
design): the margin of victory in municipal and regional elections (BROLLO; 
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NANNICINI, 2011; BROLLO; TROIANO, 2014; GALASSO; NANNICINI, 
2011; PAOLA; SCOPAA, 2011). The main idea is that political competition is 
fiercer in states where the result of the elections is more disputed, which 
would restrict corruption (this will be better discussed in the Methods and 
data section). 
The main hypothesis in this paper is that the decision of an individual to 
allocate his talent in the entrepreneurial activity depends on his capacity to 
appropriate the economic gains created in the process (BAKER; 
GEDAJLOVI; LUBATKIN, 2005). Corruption, rent-seeking, lack of 
transparency, weak institutional framework and lack of trust in a particular 
region decrease the economic gains an entrepreneur might obtain when he 
starts a business. Just like a new tax, the requirement of some kind of 
payment in order to use a public good or service might make the 
entrepreneurial activity less profitable or even increase the risk of failure. In 
such a scenario, the existence of a corrupt bureaucratic structure may ruin 
the entrepreneur’s willingness to start a business, or at least reduce his 
incentives to undertake a project. Thus, corruption may reallocate talent from 
the entrepreneurial activity to some other less productive activity 
(ACEMOGLU; VERDIER, 1998; DUTTA; KAR; ROY, 2011). 
This paper is organized into five parts (this Introduction is the first one 
of them). First, we document the traditional theoretical foundations for the 
spatial variation models that analyze the establishment of new companies 
and the theoretical approach to corruption. Next, we present the 
methodology, the variables considered and the regional corruption index. 
After that, we discuss the results. Finally, we draw our conclusions. 
Our results indicate that corruption did not affect firm creation in the 
Brazilian states from 1998 to 2008. In addition, we found no effects on the 
informal job market or on the size of firms. The only evidence of causality is 
the increase of public sector jobs, a phenomenon known in the literature as 
a misallocation of talent (ACEMOGLU; VERDIER, 1998). 
 
2 Literature review 
 
The establishment of new companies has been considered an 
important factor to determine regional development policies for over 20 
years. The creation of new businesses is an important key to promote 
economic growth (JOHNSON, 2004). However, policy makers are constantly 
challenged by spatial variations in the rate of firm creation, both inside a 
country and between countries. The variations between countries are 
constantly demonstrated in the studies of the Global Entrepreneurship 
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Monitor (GEM). Their study for 2013 (AMORÓS; BOSMA, 2013), for 
example, which covered 70 countries, showed that the Total Early-Stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) — which assesses the percentage of working 
age population, both those about to start an entrepreneurial activity and 
those that started one at most 3 and a half years prior to the study — ranged 
from 39% in Zambia and Nigeria to only 5% in Italy and Japan. The same 
study showed a wide variation between different regions of the world. The 
highest rates were in Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Spatial variation is also considerable within a country. In the United 
States, for example, Reynolds (1994) found that the quotient between the 
highest and the lowest regional rates was 4.1%. Johnson (2004), in a study 
of Great Britain in the period between 1994 and 2001, found the highest rate 
in London and the lowest in North Ireland. Ashcroft, Coppins and Raeside 
(1994), using municipal data for the United Kingdom, discovered that the 
rate of establishment of new companies varies both in time and in space. 
An expansion of demand is usually related to an incentive for the 
creation of new companies, which would lead to the growth of businesses 
and new opportunities for economic gains. On the other hand, the availability 
of production factors would ease the creation of new firms. In the literature, it 
is common to see variables associated with income, schooling and 
unemployment used as proxies for demand (BOSMA et al., 2008; 
REYNOLDS, 1994). 
Empirical evidence shows that new companies might originate from 
small-scale production industries. Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Audretsch 
and Thurik (2001) assume that the smaller the firm size in a region, the 
higher the number of new companies created. 
The third group includes measures of cultural attitude and policies that 
incentivize entrepreneurship in the analysis of regional determinants. 
Although this group is important to the theoretical literature, its empirical 
relevance is limited (DAVIDSSON; WIKLUND, 1997). In general, papers 
have been using proportion of immigrants (GAROFOLI, 1994) and public 
expenditure as proxies for the attitude and effect of policies (SUTARIA; 
HICKS, 2004). 
Although this field of study — regional variations of the establishment of 
new companies — originated from empirical evidence in developed 
countries, it is even more important in emerging countries. Generally 
speaking, their economic institutions and policies are not consolidated yet, 
making them more vulnerable to external influences. In an ambient with bad 
institutions, the existence of corruption might alter the economic incentives to 
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In economics, corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public 
power in order to obtain private gains (AKÇAY, 2006; SCHLEIFER; VISHNY, 
1993). It takes place when economic agents approach politicians with the 
intention of obtaining some kind of advantage or benefit.2 Thus, bureaucrats 
try to maximize their personal gains through their influence on the market 
and negotiations with economic agents. As a result, corruption may alter the 
economic performance of an investment. Economically viable projects may 
be set aside for projects chosen through corrupt ways.  
The process of innovation, uncertain in its nature, needs the certainty 
that the best project will be chosen. In a society in which market rules do not 
define which projects are the best, entrepreneurial activity turns riskier, 
transactional costs increase and the creation of new companies is 
discouraged. 
The hypothesis is that the decision about allocating talents in 
entrepreneurial activity depends on the capacity of appropriating the 
economic gains created by the entrepreneur’s effort (BAKER; GEDAJLOVI; 
LUBATKIN, 2005). Corruption increases the risks of having to share the 
economic gains with government members in exchange for a public good, 
service or authorization, reducing the benefits and incentives of being an 
entrepreneur. 
Since the 1990s, with the appearance of several empirical works, 
everything known about corruption and its interaction with other economic 
and social variables has been put to the test. Mauro (1995) was the first to 
use cross-section analysis to estimate the effects of corruption on economic 
growth. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) studied the behavior of public investment 
when facing corruption, while Al-Marhubi (2000) chose inflation as his object 
of study. Akçay (2006) and Rose-Ackerman (2004) analyzed the impact of 
corruption on the countries’ Human Development Index. Several other works 
could be cited, but little has been done to analyze the impact of corruption 
on entrepreneurship. 
Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) used panel data with fixed effect 
estimates to industrial sectors and found that the rate of entry of new 
companies is not affected by the corruption index in the euro zone, although 
a negative effect was found in a subsample relative to Eastern and Central 
Europe. Ovaska and Sobel (2005), with a sample of ex-socialist countries 
from Eastern Europe, found that corruption reduces the number of new 
companies. Dreher and Gassebner (2013) tested a similar hypothesis for a 
sample of 43 countries in unbalanced panel data. They found evidence that 
corruption increases entrepreneurial activity. 
                                                          
2
 The worst possible result in a corrupt economy is bad resource allocation. This is a common 
corollary in every model cited in this paper. 
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Regarding the effect of corruption on the informal sector, Dutta, Kar and 
Roy (2011) analyzed India. They used three informality definitions and did 
not find robust results. Only one of the definitions seemed to be affected and 
presented a slight link between corruption and the informal sector. 
In Brazil, the literature dedicated to understating the relationship 
between corruption and entrepreneurship is still incipient. In a survey on this 
issue, Palifka (2006) analyzes the results of the 2004 Global Corruption 
Barometer. The survey respondents emphasized that the presence of 
corruption among different branches of the government is an obstacle to 
business development in Brazil. Melo, Sampaio and Oliveira (2015) used a 
panel data model to estimate the empiric relation between firm creation and 
corruption from 2000 to 2008. Their main source for the corruption variable 
was the Register of Irregular Accounts of the Court of Audit (Cadirreg). Their 
fixed effects model evidenced a positive relation between corruption and firm 
creation. Bologna and Ross (2015) used municipal data from a 2003 random 
auditing carried out by the Federal Court of Accounts of Brazil (TCU) in 467 
Brazilian cities. They used the proportion of resources audited by the TCU 
as a proxy for corruption, and the total number of companies by sector as a 
proxy for entrepreneurship. Their results indicated a negative relation 
between the variables, both in the short and in the long run. 
As a whole, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways. 
First, by evaluating the impact of corruption, based on regional data for the 
Brazilian states. Second, the method of instrumental variables is used to  
analyze not only the correlation but also the causality between corruption 
and the creation of firms. Third, we seek alternatives to the hypothesis that 
the entrepreneurial activity is affected by its effects on other sectors of the 
economy.  
 
3 Methods and data 
 
Since the purpose of this paper is to identify the causal effect of 
corruption on entrepreneurship, simple differences in means, as offered in 
methods of selection based on observable factors, are not enough. This 
stems from the fact that there probably are unobservable factors, fixed 
and/or variable in time, correlated with both corruption and entrepreneurship. 
For example, immigrants from different parts of the world have settled in 
different regions of Brazil and brought along their social rules, which are not 
likely to change a lot as time passes. Some aspects of social rules might be 
correlated with corruption (e.g. the rules of the mafia) and, at the same time, 
with entrepreneurial activities (e.g. the mafia business). As a consequence, 
Does governmental corruption affect entrepreneurship in Brazil?                                                  623 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 37, n. 3, p. 615-642, dez. 2016 
we need to explore an alternative in which regional corruption is not 
correlated with unobservable factors related to both entrepreneurship and 
corruption. In this paper, we use the method of instrumental variables in two 
stages. Our instrument is created from the concept of margin of victory in 
regional elections. 
The margin of victory is the smallest number k such that changing k 
votes can change the winners. The idea is that the high level of political 
competition (evidenced by ‘tight’ elections) indicates randomness in the 
results, and this would make them uncorrelated with unobservable factors. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the margin of victory is widely used in 
political economy literature. It is also reasonably established in the same 
literature that electoral disputes reflect political competition. The smaller the 
margin of victory, the more competitive the political environment, and the 
opposite is also true. That being said, the main hypothesis here is that the 
more competitive the political environment, the lower the levels of corruption. 
That is, indirectly, the smaller the margin of victory is, the less corruption 
there is. Therefore, a binary variable is equal to 1 when the state election is 
decided in the second round and within a margin of victory of 1.5 percentage 
points (p.p.), and 0 otherwise.3 
In this paper, the method of instrumental variables is used in the first 
stage to estimate the effect of the margin of victory (of 1.5 p.p., according to 
our binary variable) on corruption. In the second stage, we estimate the 
effect of corruption, obtained from the regional and temporal variations of the 
margin of victory, uncorrelated with unobservable factors variable in time, 
conditional to some observable factors and to factors fixed in time, on 
entrepreneurship.   
Therefore, these are the equations to be estimated: 
 = 		 +  +  +  +                                                        (1) 
 =  +  +  +  +                                                         (2) 
CPit is the corruption index in the state i for the period t, MVit is the binary 
variable for the margin of victory in the state i for the period t, EPit is the net 
establishment of new companies for 10,000 inhabitants (proxy for 
entrepreneurship), Xit is a vector containing the independent variables,  is 
the tendency,  is the fixed effect of the state i and  and  are randomly 
distributed error terms.  
                                                          
3
 The variable margin is equal to 0 whenever the election is decided in the first round. 
Besides that, it is clear from the creation process that its value is constant between 
elections. Also, a closer to 1.5 margin of victory is uninteresting because it allows for little or 
no cross-section variation in the dummy variable. 
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Five models with different groups of explanatory variables were 
estimated. The explanatory variables used are: average years of schooling 
of adults over age 25, proportion of unionized workers, unemployment rate, 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, tax revenue per capita and 
number of homicides per 1,000 inhabitants. All of these variables were 
carefully selected in accordance with both the literature of corruption and 
entrepreneurship and the three big groups of regional determinants 
organized by Bosma et al. (2008), as seen in the previous section. The 
descriptive statistics of the variables used is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study 
 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Firm creation 
Net establishment of 
companies per 10,000 
inhabitants 
19.99465 8.410339 4.03794 55.10973 
Public sector Proportion of public 
sector workers 0.092698 0.0432654 7,22E-05 0.2430386 
Informality1 Informality measure 1 63.61808 11.89057 38.00683 90.47856 
Informality2 Informality measure 2 63.26797 11.97816 36.7684 90.99865 
Informality3 Informality measure 3 60.34131 11.76549 35.69151 88.23217 
Firm size Average firm size 1.888177 0.0180852 1.845706 1.932242 
Corruption Corruption index 0.251185 0.2481855 0 1 
Schooling Average years of 
schooling 5.922141 1.157827 3.477499 9.392572 
Union Proportion of unionized 
workers 0.172106 0.057766 0.050283 0.3439199 
Unrate Unemployment rate 9.404792 2.752824 4.4193 20.5375 
gdppercapita Gross Domestic Product per capita 5.829123 3.660374 1.496361 23.79954 
Homicides Homicides per 1,000 inhabitants 0.264657 0.1344884 0.04614 0.6054857 
tax_revenue Real tax revenue per 
capita 474.7572 256.5107 95.52549 1437.106 
margin_1v5 Margin of victory of 1.5 p.p. 0.087542 0.2831048 0 1 
margin_2v5 Margin of victory of 2.5 p.p. 0.13468 0.3419578 0 1 
margin_5 Margin of victory of 5.0 p.p. 0.306397 0.4617748 0 1 
margin_10 Margin of victory of 10.0 p.p. 0.430976 0.4960486 0 1 
 
In order to validate the instrumental variable, we estimated equation (1), 
while relaxing the margin of victory from 1.5 to 2.5, 5.0 and finally 10.0 p.p. If 
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the idea behind this instrument is valid, these estimates with larger margins 
of victory should not present statistically significant coefficients. 
Besides the net establishment of new companies, other dependent 
variables connected with entrepreneurship, and likely to be affected by 
corruption, were used: proportion of public sector workers, proportion of 
informal sector workers and average firm size (measured by the number of 
employees). The first one was used to examine the possibility that 
employees from the private sector would prefer working in the public sector 
because of corruption. The second one was used to study the possibility that 
entrepreneurs and workers would choose informality to other sectors, again 
because of corruption. And the third one was used to explore the possibility 
that an entrepreneur could change the size of his firm because of corruption. 
In this case, it is believed that an entrepreneur might choose to embark on a 
project in spite of corruption; however, he would probably want to keep his 
firm small. Apart from that, we estimated the effect of corruption on the 
number of formal companies in different size ranges. 
The data used in this paper were obtained from several sources. The 
numbers relative to workers in the public sector, unionized workers, 
employed workers and economically active population were obtained from 
the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD)4; the number of homicides 
is available in the Department of Informatics of the Unified Health System 
(Datasus); the electoral results used to create the instrumental variables are 
from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE); schooling data are from the Institute 
for Applied Economic Research (IPEA); the tax revenue values are from the 
National Treasury Secretariat, corrected by the GDP deflator published by 
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The GDP per 
capita, the unemployment rate and informality measures5 are also from 
IBGE. Firm size variables were obtained from the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment, and data about created and closed companies are from their 
respective state’s Board of Trade and from the National Department of 
Business Registration (DNRC). The net firm creation was divided by 
population size. 
                                                          
4
 When data for the year of 2000 were not available, the mean between the information of 
1999 and 2001 was used. 
5
 Three definitions of informality were tested. The first one comes from the following quotient: 
(unregistered workers + self-employed individuals) / (workers under the protection of the 
Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) + unregistered workers + self-employed individuals). 
The second one was calculated according to this: (unregistered workers + self-employed 
individuals + unpaid workers) / (workers under the protection of the CLT + unregistered 
workers + self-employed individuals + unpaid workers + employers). And the third one 
considered (unregistered workers + self-employed individuals) / (workers under the 
protection of the CLT + unregistered workers + self-employed  individuals+ employers). 
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Special attention must be given to the regional corruption index. One of 
the mechanisms created to guarantee the proper use of public resources is 
the Office of the Comptroller General6 (CGU), created in 2001, whose main 
goal is to defend public assets and prevent and combat corruption through 
internal control activities and public audits. Every program and project that 
involves federal resources is audited for irregularities. When a case is judged 
irregular, it becomes part of a database of irregular accounts (Cadirreg), 
created by the TCU. 
This database comprises every case judged irregular after the auditing 
has taken place. According to Brasil (2013), the accounts are analyzed 
under aspects of legality, legitimacy, financial soundness, efficiency and 
effectiveness and then judged as: 
a) regular, when they reflect exactly the accounting documents and 
demonstrate the legality, legitimacy and financial soundness of the 
acts of the party in charge; 
b) regular with reservations, when the accounts contain inappropriate 
characteristics or any type of fault that does not result in loss to the 
public treasury; 
c) irregular, when one of the following instances is confirmed: failure to 
submit accounting for approval; performance of an administrative act 
that is deemed illegal, illegitimate, unsound or not in compliance with 
legal or statutory norms; losses to the public treasury resulting from 
any illegitimate or unsound administrative act, embezzlement or 
misappropriation of public funds, assets or valuables. 
When accounts are considered irregular and an amount is owed, the 
Court demands that the responsible party pay the debt with applicable fines 
added. This Cadirreg database is analyzed and every irregular case that 
does not result in loss to the public treasury is removed. Thus, cases whose 
irregularities are considered honest mistakes by the Court are discarded and 
the final database comprises only accounts deemed irregular and judged for 
financial loss to the public treasury. 
Some authors (BROLLO; NANNICINI, 2011; FERRAZ; FINAN, 2011; 
FERRAZ; FINAN; MOREIRA, 2012) used Cadirreg data to study the 
chances of reelection in corrupt regions and the effect of corruption on public 
spending on education. In this paper, the methodology applied to build the 
regional corruption index is based on the multivariate analysis of Carraro et 
al. (2015), specifically on the principal component analysis. A set of regional 
variables related to the value and the amount of irregular accounts is used, 
resulting in a regional corruption index for every Brazilian state.7 The 
                                                          
6
 See www.cgu.gov.br for further information. 
7
 See Carraro et al. (2015). 
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variables used by Carraro et al. (2015) are the following: federal transfers 
received by each state following the Annual Budget Law (LOA); proportion of 
irregular accounts on Cadirreg by state; proportion of the total monetary 
value of the irregular accounts by state. 
The database used in this paper presents a panel data structure from 
1998 to 2008. Therefore, there are 297 observations, 11 for every one of the 
27 states under analysis. Table 1 presents a description of the variables 
used. 
During the period analyzed in this paper, four gubernatorial elections 
took place, in a total of 108 regional elections. Fifty-four of these were 
decided in the second round, 9 of which fit in the 1.5 p.p. margin of victory 
definition. Fifteen governors were elected with a margin of up to 2.5 p.p., 32 
with a margin of up to 5 p.p. and 48 with a margin of up to 10 points. 
 
4 Results 
 
The estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 2. In every model, 
from the simplest to the most complete, the margin of victory seems to have 
a negative impact on the corruption index. The estimated coefficients 
present similar values in the five different models and are always statistically 
significant at 1.0% level. The effect of a disputed election reduces, on 
average, the corruption index in 13 points. 
The results are robust, since the ‘placebo’ study (presented in Table 3), 
with wider margins of victory, shows decreasing coefficients until it stops 
being significant. When the margin of victory is defined in 2.5 p.p., the 
coefficient is about half the one obtained with the main definition. When the 
10.0 p.p. definition is used, the coefficient is close to zero and is not 
significant. 
The second stage estimates (equation (2)) for the five IV models are 
presented in Table 4. The last column shows pooled OLS estimates in order 
to compare the coefficients.8 Along with the coefficients in every second 
stage estimate, we present the R2, F and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (for 
underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap)) statistics. 
In every estimated model, although the coefficients for the corruption 
variable were positive, they did not show statistical significance. The same 
result was obtained from the pooled OLS model. These estimates suggest 
that corruption does not affect entrepreneurship. This is different from what 
was found by Melo, Sampaio and Oliveira (2015) and Bologna and Ross 
                                                          
8
 Pooled OLS was used to estimate only the most complete model. 
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(2015), although comparison is made difficult because of the diverse 
corruption and entrepreneurship variables used in each study. Regardless of 
this fact, this paper is conceptually more similar to what was done by Melo, 
Sampaio and Oliveira (2015), who found a statistically significant (at 1%) 
positive coefficient. 
 
Table 2 
 
Effect of margin of victory on corruption 
 
CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION 
margin_1v5 -0.1319*** -0.1323*** -0.1331*** -0.1273*** -0.1278*** (0.0439) (0.0440) (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0450) 
schooling  0.0112 0.0124 0.0121 0.0121 
 (0.0374) (0.0378) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
union 
  0.1242 0.0147 0.0319 
  (0.4639) (0.4785) (0.4855) 
unrate 
   -0.0038 -0.0042 
   (0.0070) (0.0072) 
Gdppercapita    -0.0131 -0.0112 
   (0.0133) (0.0158) 
homicides    0.0521 0.0533 
   (0.1931) (0.1936) 
tax_revenue 
    -0.0000 
    (0.0002) 
r2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
F 4.81 4.40 4.05 3.37 3.17 
N 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
 
Table 3 
 
Validation of the instrumental variables (IV) 
 
 CORRUPTION CORRUPTION CORRUPTION 
margin_2v5 -0.0683*   
(0.0386)   
margin_5  -0.0655**  
 (0.0326)  
margin_10   -0.0298 
  (0.0294) 
R2 0.16 0.16 0.15 
F 2.83 2.89 2.68 
N 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
NOTE: 3. The three regressions include the same explanatory variables as the most complete IV models. 
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Table 4 
 
Effect of corruption on entrepreneurship 
 
 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES POOLED 
ORDINAR
Y LEAST 
SQUARES 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Corruption 5.6420 6.6730 7.6059 7.6250 7.1063 1.7062 (7.7479) (7.8673) (7.7776) (7.8714) (7.8997) (1.2403) 
Schooling  3.5104* 3.6866* 3.3264** 3.3321** 3.3849** 
 (1.9275) (1.9151) (1.5766) (1.5558) (1.5406) 
Union   19.1726 12.1149 9.6554 9.1802 
  (12.2946) (10.4547) (10.3609) (7.9860) 
Unrate    -0.1110 -0.0657 -0.0891 
   (0.1594) (0.1577) (0.2444) 
Gdpper-
capita 
   -0.2655 -0.5450 -0.6434* 
   (0.3244) (0.3549) (0.3379) 
Homicides    12.2976** 12.1506** 12.1774 
   (5.1361) (5.0216) (10.4415) 
tax_reven
ue 
    0.0071* 0.0070 
    (0.0038) (0.0065) 
R2 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.93 
F 19.94 18.17 16.68 14.29 13.82 280.46 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
NOTE: 4. Net establishment of companies per 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
 
The same lack of causality is observed when the effect of corruption on 
informality is estimated — a robust result, since the coefficients are not 
significant for all three of the informality definitions (Tables 5 to 7). 
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Table 5 
 
Effect of corruption on informality (definition I) 
 
 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES POOLED 
ORDINAR
Y LEAST 
SQUARES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Corruption -3.0834 -3.9153 -4.8071 -4.9691 -4.5076 2.4503* (3.4402) (3.2328) (3.2826) (3.4206) (3.5223) (1.4601) 
Schooling  -2.8324*** -3.0008*** -2.9810*** -2.9861*** -4.5892*** 
 (0.5221) (0.5238) (0.4942) (0.4765) (0.9331) 
Union   -18.3274** -17.9335** -15.7453** -28.2092*** 
  (7.2048) (7.3208) (7.2926) (7.7880) 
Unrate    -0.1667 -0.2070* 0.0118 
   (0.1141) (0.1135) (0.1953) 
gdppercapita    -0.0315 0.2171 0.1384 
   (0.2133) (0.2272) (0.4790) 
Homicides    -0.4292 -0.2984 -0.3443 
   (2.2522) (2.1356) (3.1517) 
tax_revenue 
    -0.0063*** -0.0243*** 
    (0.0023) (0.0048) 
R2 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.75 
F 37.37 40.57 35.94 29.61 30.51 38.08 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
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Table 6 
 
Effect of corruption on informality (definition II) 
 
 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES POOLED 
ORDINAR
Y LEAST 
SQUARES 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Corruption -1.0655 -2.1098 -3.0736 -2.7643 -2.3615 2.3019* (3.4317) (3.0048) (3.0198) (3.2457) (3.3843) (1.2971) 
Schooling  -3.5560*** -3.7380*** -3.7530*** -3.7574*** -5.6108*** 
 (0.5631) (0.5786) (0.5275) (0.5144) (0.8617) 
Union   -19.8065*** -18.8343** -16.9243** -21.5077*** 
  (7.3313) (7.3226) (7.2810) (6.8463) 
Unrate    -0.1776 -0.2128* 0.0852 
   (0.1210) (0.1211) (0.1837) 
gdppercapita    0.0860 0.3030 0.4032 
   (0.1883) (0.2098) (0.4153) 
Homicides    0.1500 0.2642 0.6955 
   (2.4118) (2.3143) (2.9420) 
tax_revenue 
    -0.0055** -0.0256*** 
    (0.0023) (0.0043) 
R2 0.65 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.80 
F 47.49 59.94 54.32 46.05 46.13 52.15 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
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Table 7 
 
Effect of corruption on informality (definition III) 
 
  INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES POOLED 
ORDINAR
Y LEAST 
SQUARES 
  
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Corruption -2.7510 -3.6656 -4.7023 -4.6397 -4.3325 2.5371* (3.4932) (3.2094) (3.2408) (3.3763) (3.4459) (1.4198) 
Schooling  -3.1140*** -3.3098*** -3.3207*** -3.3240*** -4.6357*** 
 (0.5684) (0.5873) (0.5309) (0.5216) (0.9431) 
Union   -21.3058*** -20.8770*** -19.4201*** -28.0086*** 
  (7.5338) (7.5000) (7.4885) (7.5457) 
Unrate    -0.1914 -0.2182* 0.1605 
   (0.1192) (0.1200) (0.2002) 
gdppercapita    0.0141 0.1796 0.2443 
   (0.1956) (0.2137) (0.4729) 
Homicides    0.3336 0.4207 0.1167 
   (2.2419) (2.1718) (3.1457) 
tax_revenue 
    -0.0042* -0.0257*** 
    (0.0023) (0.0048) 
R2 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.75 
F 36.16 41.13 36.14 30.04 29.45 39.44 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
 
These results are in accordance with the ones obtained by Dutta, Kar 
and Roy (2011) for India. Among the three informality definitions used by 
them, only one seemed to be slightly affected by corruption. 
There is also no evidence that corruption affects the number of workers 
in the formal sector. Although the estimated coefficients are negative, none 
of them is statistically significant (Table 8). The estimates for number of 
companies of different size ranges are consistent. In this case, although the 
coefficients are decreasing, which suggests heterogeneous effects, none of 
them is statistically significant (Tables 9 and 10). 
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Table 8 
 
Effect of corruption on average firm size (number of employees/number of companies) 
 
 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES POOLED 
ORDINARY 
LEAST 
SQUARES 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Corruption -0.0066 -0.0058 -0.0070 -0.0074 -0.0080 0.0083** (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0034) 
Schooling  0.0026* 0.0023 0.0029* 0.0029* -0.0021 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
Union   -0.0241* -0.0128 -0.0156 0.0457** 
  (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0197) 
Unrate 
   -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0031*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
gdppercapita    0.0003 -0.0000 0.0018*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Homicides 
   -0.0185*** -0.0186*** 0.0127 
   (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0078) 
tax_revenue 
    0.0000 -0.0000*** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R2 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.38 
F 34.49 36.48 34.25 29.41 27.12 15.35 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
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Table 9 
 
Effect of corruption on firm size by ranges (sizes 1 to 5) 
 
 Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 
Corruption -1015.28 -1417.76 -1408.39 -896.72 -864.05 (2250.69) (11481.89) (3655.80) (2063.71) (1063.04) 
Schooling 932.92*** 6740.29*** 2360.48*** 1395.93*** 803.75*** (215.67) (1410.76) (542.85) (358.32) (223.24) 
Union -3779.54 -45986.97*** -16550.89*** -10020.76*** -5750.69*** (2628.09) (15614.58) (5552.56) (3456.55) (2085.05) 
Unrate -96.76 -881.10* -379.63** -262.11** -169.61** (69.04) (464.01) (172.88) (110.55) (68.33) 
gdppercapita -118.73 -1008.55 -349.64 -186.90 -104.32 (117.57) (617.14) (218.89) (136.00) (82.39) 
Homicides -2871.79 -33843.12* -17478.60*** -12815.43*** -8338.90*** (3102.86) (17805.95) (6761.82) (4538.35) (2864.90) 
tax_revenue 
0.72 -3.09 -2.87 -2.44 -1.57 
(1.74) (9.76) (3.44) (2.13) (1.27) 
R2 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 
F 9.83 13.40 12.95 11.84 10.63 
LM test 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 
N 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. The variables of size refer to the amount of firms with a certain number of employees, within the 
following ranges: size 1 refers to companies with 0 employee; size 2, from 1 to 4 employees; the 
next variables refer to these ranges, respectively: 5-9, 10-19, 20-49. 
NOTE: 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 4. The regressions include a tendency control. 
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Table 10 
 
Effect of corruption on firm size by ranges (sizes 6 to 10) 
 
 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 Size 9 Size 10 
Corruption 
-391.81 11.83 -93.69 -35.62 -12.84 
 (333.28) (165.84) (73.80) (27.64) (23.70) 
Schooling 237.15*** 111.41*** 44.29*** 20.64*** 18.34*** 
 (72.75) (30.76) (11.50) (5.33) (5.86) 
Union 
-1720.42*** -731.50** -209.96* -88.06* -143.92*** 
 (650.70) (285.87) (116.55) (51.95) (54.38) 
Unrate 
-56.23** -25.35** -8.73** -3.47** -4.25** 
 (22.28) (10.03) (3.75) (1.69) (1.72) 
Gdppercapita 
-32.01 -11.72 -8.75* -4.88** -3.57* 
 (26.91) (12.37) (5.21) (2.04) (2.02) 
Homicides 
-2824.24*** -1230.58*** -407.60** -151.93** -192.26** 
 (994.31) (452.78) (171.62) (73.48) (75.89) 
tax_revenue 
-0.56 -0.18 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05* 
 (0.40) (0.17) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) 
R2 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.47 0.47 
F 8.46 9.29 7.73 13.37 12.93 
LM test 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 8.53 
N 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1. The variables refer to companies with the following number of employees, respectively: 50-99, 100-    
-249, 250-499, 500-999 and, finally, 1,000 or more employees (Size10). 
NOTE: 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 4. The regressions include a tendency control.  
 
The only variable corruption seems to affect is the proportion of public 
sector workers. The estimated coefficients (presented in Table 11) are 
positive and, for the last three models, statistically significant, which 
suggests that, when corruption is higher, more workers choose to work in the 
public sector. This result is known as a misallocation of talent (ACEMOGLU; 
VERDIER, 1998). The estimated coefficient is 0.0343 for the most complete 
model (significant at level 5%). 
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Table 11 
 
Effect of corruption on the public sector 
 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
POOLED 
ORDINARY 
LEAST 
SQUARES 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5  
Corruption 0.0143 0.0204 0.0311* 0.0348** 0.0343** -0.0230*** (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0159) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0080) 
Schooling  0.0210*** 0.0230*** 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0042) 
Union   0.2192*** 0.2207*** 0.2180*** 0.0481 
  (0.0606) (0.0616) (0.0623) (0.0514) 
Unrate 
   0.0006 0.0007 0.0035*** 
   (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
gdppercapita    0.0009 0.0006 -0.0007 
   (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0024) 
Homicides 
   0.0066 0.0065 0.0268* 
   (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0155) 
tax_revenue 
    0.0000 -0.0001*** 
    (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R2 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.89 
F 1.74 2.41 2.74 2.47 2.34 173.01 
LM test 8.56 8.58 8.32 8.57 8.53  
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 
NOTE: 1.Standard errors in parentheses. 
NOTE: 2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
NOTE: 3. The regressions include a tendency control. 
NOTE: 4. Proportion of public sector workers among the employed workers. 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Promoting economic development is a constant preoccupation in every 
country. Among the factors that can do such a thing, the creation of new 
firms is considered essential to support it. Thus, political and academic 
interest in factors that can stimulate firm creation has grown a lot in the last 
30 years. Simultaneously, there has also been a mounting concern about 
how the presence of governmental corruption can slow down growth. It is 
known that both corruption and firm creation are heterogeneous inside a 
country.  
The purpose of this paper was to link corruption and firm creation by 
analyzing the causal effect between regional corruption and the 
establishment of new companies. While there is a solid part of the literature 
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whose purpose is to identify the positive effects of entrepreneurship on the 
economic growth of a region, it is still not clear how corruption affects 
entrepreneurship. There are basically two theoretical arguments regarding 
this topic. The first one is based on the ‘grease the wheels’ assumption 
(HUNTINGTON, 1968; LEFF, 1964), which suggests that corruption might 
increase the firm creation rate and stimulate entrepreneurial activity by 
reducing bureaucratic costs and making the government machine work. 
Therefore, corruption would bring benefits to a potential entrepreneur by 
accelerating the processes for the obtainment of the necessary permits. On 
the other hand, the second approach, the public choice school theory, states 
that corruption is a major economic expense which elevates transaction 
costs and increases the uncertainty of gains (BAUMOL, 1990). In an 
environment where the capacity to appropriate the economic gains of a 
project is uncertain, there is an incentive for inefficiently allocating the 
potential entrepreneur in unproductive activities (ACEMOGLU; VERDIER, 
1998). 
Brazil was chosen for several reasons. First, like other emerging 
countries, it presents limited economic growth based on public expenditures 
because of its indebtedness. This limitation has been forcing the government 
to give more importance to entrepreneurship as an engine for economic 
development. Second, corruption is already part of the process of business 
and negotiations between society and government. Third, as a member of 
the BRICs, Brazil is a country with growing economic and political 
participation in the international market, and is the leading economy in Latin 
America. 
Since the purpose of this paper was to identify the causal effect 
between corruption and entrepreneurship, overcoming the endogeneity 
problem was a necessity. Thus, a two-stage regression with an instrumental 
variable was used. The chosen instrument was the intensity of the electoral 
dispute in each state. The hypothesis is that high political competition levels 
promote better supervision and inhibits corruption. The first stage of the 
regression showed robust results. After that, we had to analyze the causal 
effect.  
How does corruption affect entrepreneurship? The results seem to 
indicate that the presence of corruption affects neither firm creation nor firm 
size, and it seems not to affect the informal market either. The hypothesis of 
an inefficient allocation of labor resources was also tested. In this case, 
corruption seemed to affect the proportion of public sector workers positively. 
This result supports the idea that in a society where there is corruption, 
unproductive activities are incentivized, which would reallocate existing 
talents to the public sector. 
638        Andre Carraro; Felipe G. Ribeiro; Gabriel W. Costa; Gabrielito R. Menezes; Mario D. Canever; Rodrigo N. Fernandes 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 37, n. 3, p. 615-642, dez. 2016 
The results obtained indicate that while corruption in Brazil does not 
affect firm creation or the structure of formal and informal sectors, it does 
stimulate public employment. This combination leads to a lot of questions. It 
seems logical and would be expected that an increase in the number of 
public workers — as a result of corruption — would be a consequence of a 
decreasing entrepreneur activity. Under this assumption, potential 
entrepreneurs would choose to work in the public sector, given the twisted 
incentives. However, it seems not to be the case. 
One hypothesis that arises is that only less talented agents, the ones 
who would hardly want to risk engaging in an unsafe activity, would be more 
likely to seek public sector employment, thus allowing more talented ones to 
undertake more projects and not affecting the establishment of new 
companies as a whole — at least quantitatively. On the other hand, one 
might argue that maybe it is the more talented ones who are drawn to the 
public sector when faced with governmental corruption. In this case, there 
would be a high demand for new entrepreneurs, which would attract only the 
‘second-best’ human capital available to the activity. Again, firm creation 
would not be quantitatively affected. Nevertheless, in either case, there is a 
high possibility that corruption affects the quality of the entrepreneurial 
activity, hence interfering with the channels through which it promotes 
economic growth. New research could contribute to the literature by 
exploring the effect of corruption on the quality of entrepreneurship, for 
instance, analyzing the human capital dedicated to the activity.  
It is worth emphasizing that our evidences are subject to the usual 
critiques of the instrumental variables. To reach a consensus about the 
causal impact of corruption on entrepreneurship a lot more papers are 
required. More studies with different methodologies and database are crucial 
for our better understanding of the role of corruption in economic 
development.  
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